So the term “same” in your idea was also held THEORETICALLY or “fictive”.

It’s not clear whether you are intending to defend or suggesting to reform the current monetary system. I think if you are choosing the first option, just say it and provide your supporting materials in a separate link. Your supporting materials here cannot exceed those in the paper.

I think Pasbaxo’s base argument “A new world currency as accepted by all participants would be loaded with the SAME mass of debts” is problematic. How can they be the SAME? The truth is that our current monetary system is not fair and we are depriving our future generations of the living right.

The administrative rules of the new policy are designed to avoid ‘pryomanic behaviour’. This is not a major problem for sequestration rewards and subsidies for cleaner energy. Decarbonising industry is where the pyromanic behaviour is relevant, and this is prevented with administrative rules.

If industrial installations were to artificially raise their emissions, they would incur the costs for the fossil fuels and associated carbon taxes, and they may be breaking (new) laws – laws that may even include currency counterfeiting laws that would be regarded as a criminal offence. The data provided by polluting industry will become public domain, and so it is unlikely that firms will just burn excessive fuels in pyromanic behaviour – given the social backlash, bad publicity, criminal actions, and taxes. Administrative conditions can be designed with a lead in period that monitors emissions prior the first assessment period to verify the existing emissions pattern. Many industries already report their emissions for tax purposes. Once the firm’s emissions pattern is established, the firm will be incentivised to reduce their average emissions over time – so there is no future incentive to raise pollution levels after starting the scheme.

The world currency mechanism will internalise the costs of greenhouse mitigation and incentivise market-based solutions. This is its key purpose.

The administrative rules of the new policy will not encourage ‘pryomanic behaviour’, because they will reward sequestration and subsidise cleaner energy.

If industrial installations were to artificially raise their emissions, they would incur the costs for the fossil fuels and associated carbon taxes, and may be breaking (new) laws that may even be supported by currency counterfeiting laws. The data provided by polluting industry will become public domain, and so it is unlikely that firms will burn excessive fuels in pyromanic behaviour – given a potential social backlash and bad publicity. Administrative conditions can be designed with a lead in period that monitors emissions prior the first assessment period to prevent pyromanic behavior. Many industries already report their emissions for tax purposes. Once the firm’s emissions pattern is established, the firm will be incentivised to reduce their average emissions over time.

The world currency mechanism will internalise the costs of greenhouse mitigation and incentivise market-based solutions. This is its key purpose.

A new world currency as accepted by all participants would be loaded with the same mass of debts
and herefore could not function better, left a better exchange flexibility. The monetary QE system proposed by me is an attempt to collect more liquidities to fill a concerned currency legally as part of the concerned monetary system. The process stays fictive untill the results are computed and the costs are abstracted.
Two equal parts of the total amount incl. debts of the Monetary Central Bank are placed against eachother, the first part of which the currency should be devaluated by dividing 1 through 100 and the second part of which the currency should be revaluated by multiplying by 1 with 100, as consequence the first amount-part to be divided by 100 and the second amount-part to be multiplied with 100.
The total of revenues should be subjected to a realizing electronic multiplication process.
The SDR could function as a world currency, but recognition problems to exchange at banks and
lack of obligation to receive, and unclear verbalization of purpose served as reasons to eliminate the QE function. It degraded again in a means to collect contribution parts from members states IMF. The new President cq new policy is only based on lending/borrowing and seems not able not solve debts-problems. Moreover the IMF is not a monetary union but a fund and as such not able to take essential
monetary decisions.
Bonds and obligations and other debt- packaging materials could not function as debt relievers, as history already proved. Last ressort obligations demand back-paying of delivered values and new package methods could not solve the same problem. Quick working speculaive means as futures could,
but the risks are considerably and emittants should pay their own debts. A currency movement system self composed and dominated by the concerned monetary union, could restrict the dangers of speculation to zero by confronting two parts of the same currency to each other , evitating in first instance confrontation with other currencies. Eliminating membership of IMF could ease the process,
A world one-currency system would not encounter such problems but attempts to foundation could encounter them beforehand. The system demands compensation criteria to determine heights of QE
amounts , f.i. by means of PPP criteria complied by a freight weight measure, governments’s and
production tax heights a.s.o., in order to equalize the comparance base. A world system, f.i. ruled by he
World Bank, would give the World Bank much hindering authority , whereas a world consent to all existing monetary unions to multiply banknotes electronically in self chosen amount heights would not not even be necessary.